The story
In November 1890 Baring Brothers, one of the most prestigious merchant banks in London, found itself unable to pay its debts. It had underwritten large bond issues for Argentina, including for the Buenos Aires Water Supply and Drainage Company, and then been left holding securities it could not sell when the Argentine boom collapsed and the government in Buenos Aires was shaken by a revolt in July. The bank's liabilities were put at roughly 16 to 21 million pounds in different accounts. William Lidderdale, the Governor of the Bank of England, organized a guarantee fund of about 17 million pounds from London banks, which prevented a panic and let Barings be wound down into a new company.
Argentina had drawn heavy British investment in railways, land and public works in the 1880s, and Barings, founded in 1762, had become deeply exposed. Lidderdale borrowed gold from the Bank of France and from Russia and persuaded the other banks, with Rothschild's help, to share the risk. Walter Bagehot had argued in Lombard Street in 1873 that a central bank should lend freely in a crisis to solvent firms against good collateral, and this episode showed that principle in action, although with banks' money rather than the Bank's alone. Barings reopened as a limited company and survived for another century.
Why it mattered
- The rescue became a model for central banks acting as lenders of last resort, a role later formalized in institutions like the Federal Reserve.
- It showed that private bankers could coordinate to stop a panic, a pattern repeated in later crises.
- The crisis also taught investors in London about the risk of concentrated bets on emerging-market debt.
Sources
- Rescuing a SIFI, Halting a Panic: the Barings Crisis of 1890 Bank of England (Bank Underground)
- The Baring Crisis of 1890-91 NBER
Drafted by AI (Claude) from the sources above and checked against them by AI; no historian has reviewed this page. Spot a mistake? Suggest a correction. How pages are made
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